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Wage Strikes in 1880s America: A Test of the War of Attrition Model 
 
Abstract 
By relating strike outcomes and durations to the value of the disputed wage change and to 
the cost to each side of continuing the strike, this paper tests the hypothesis that the war 
of attrition with asymmetric information model of strikes accurately describes the 
characteristics of strikes over wages in the United States in the early to middle part of the 
1880s.  That hypothesis is not rejected by linear, probit, or nonparametric kernel 
estimation.  Specifically, variables that decrease a side’s cost of striking or increase its 
opponent’s cost are shown to increase its maximum holdout time, and vice versa, and 
strike duration increases with the value of the prize in dispute and with uncertainty about 
the outcome.  Alternative game theoretic models of strikes – signaling and screening 
models, and models with ongoing negotiations – do not fit the data as well.  We also 
explore why the strikes took the form of wars of attrition, and why later strikes did not.  
Our results have implications for modern union behavior in the face of globalization. 
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 On Monday, June 23, 1884, nearly 1800 bituminous coal miners in Ohio’s 
Hocking River Valley went on strike to protest a wage cut announced the previous 
Friday.  Facing a depression, fierce competition from other mines, and slack summertime 
demand, the mine operators required the lower wage in order to maintain profitability 
(Rossel, 2002 p.5).  The feeling among the union miners, though, was that the operators 
intended to deprive them of their just wages, to control the labor market, and to “crush 
them out” (Lozier, 1963 p.56).  For their part, the owners “expected the miners would 
resist the wage cut demand but did not think they could hold out long … . [F]or the first 
two weeks the operators did nothing but wait for union submission” (Lozier, 1963 p.58).  
In fact, the strike lasted nearly ten months.  On March 18, 1885, the miners accepted the 
operators’ wage terms and returned to work.  That costly strike, typical in many ways of 
the great wave of strikes in the United States in the 1880s, is difficult to explain with a 
model based on one-sided incomplete information, such as signaling or screening models.  
Instead, the two sides’ “mutual hostility” and “inability to understand the needs and 
motives of each other” (Lozier, 1963 p.108) are suggestive of bilateral asymmetric 
information, and in particular of the war of attrition. 
 In the war of attrition (Maynard Smith, 1974), two sides compete for an 
indivisible prize.  They keep fighting, each trying to gauge how much longer its foe can 
endure, until one side finally gives up.  The victor obtains the prize; the loser has nothing 
to show for its costs.  The asymmetric information version of the war of attrition, where 
neither side knows the exact value of its opponent’s costs, is a possible explanation of 
how labor strikes unfold.  This paper tests whether the predictions of the war of attrition 
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model are consistent with the characteristics of strikes over wages in the United States in 
the 1880s. 
 The Third Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor (1888) contains detailed 
data on those strikes.  The Third Report includes strikes over a variety of causes  —  the 
advantage of looking at wage strikes is that the value of the prize in dispute is easy to 
quantify.  Card and Olson (1995) have previously analyzed the strikes of the 1880s using 
a war of attrition model.  However, their aim is not to test the validity of the model.  
Instead, they assume that it holds and look for a relationship between the probability that 
workers win a strike and the wage increase conditional on success.1  Here, by relating 
strike outcomes and durations to the value of the disputed wage change and to 
determinants of the cost to each side of continuing the strike, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the war of attrition model is correct.  Specifically, the data show that an 
increase in variables that lower a side’s cost of striking (the wage available in alternative 
employment and warm weather for workers, the capital labor ratio for firms) has a 
positive, statistically significant effect on that side’s maximum holdout time.  Conversely, 
raising the value of variables that increase the cost of striking (the foregone wage and the 
local unemployment rate for workers, the value of yearly output and the fraction of 
employees out on strike for firms) results in a statistically significant drop in the holdout 
time.  Also, the expected duration of a strike increases with the value of the prize in 
dispute.  The duration also rises when the predicted probability of success for the workers 
is close to one half – that is, strikes where one side has a clear advantage end more 
                                                          
1 Because Card and Olson (1995) find that predictors of strike success are correlated with the post-strike 
wage change, and because each side’s holdout time depends on that projected wage change, Card and 
Olson’s (1995) estimates may suffer from omitted variable bias.  They also include strike duration, an 
endogenous variable, as a regressor. 
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quickly.  Alternative models of strikes based on signaling and screening do not fit the 
data as well, and neither do models that allow for continued bargaining during the strike. 
The war of attrition, relative even to other types of strikes, is a very costly way to 
settle labor disputes.  Why, then, did the wage strikes of the 1880s take that form?  Card 
and Olson (1995) offer one possible explanation, that the actual issue in dispute in many 
of the strikes was whether or not workers had the right to bargain collectively; that issue 
could not be compromised.  The data suggest that that explanation is incorrect.  Instead, 
we identify three factors leading to wars of attrition:  the two sides did not trust each 
other to honor agreements, impartial arbitration was unavailable, and the surplus to be 
divided was small.  Over time, changes in macroeconomic conditions and product market 
structures, combined with a growing recognition of the high costs of war-of-attrition 
strikes, led to an increase in negotiation and compromise. 
In the conclusion, we explore how the factors that led to wars of attrition in the 
1880s may arise again in an era of globalization. 
 
Strikes in the 1880s 
 The 1860s saw the beginnings of national labor organizations in the United States, 
spurred by the price fluctuations of the Civil War and by the downward pressure on 
wages as railroads opened up businesses to increased competition.  The long depression 
from 1873 to 1879 and a series of failed railroad strikes in 1877, however, dealt serious 
blows to the young labor movement.  The great rise of organized labor, and especially of 
the Knights of Labor, came in the 1880s.  The Knights’ membership grew from 20,000 in 
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1879 to 700,000 in 1886.  The total membership of labor organizations in the later year 
was close to one million.  (Commons et al., 1926) 
 With the rise in labor organization membership came a rise in strike activity.  In 
1886 alone the United States Bureau of Labor reported almost 2500 strikes 
(Commissioner of Labor, 1888).  The most common cause of the strikes was disputes 
over wages.  Strikes are of particular interest to economists because they are wasteful.  
During a strike, firms lose profits and workers lose wages.  Both sides would have been 
better off if their final agreement had been implemented without a strike.  During the late 
nineteenth century, the number of strikes was growing, as Figure 1 shows.  That growth 
continued into the twentieth century: in 1915 there were over 3500 strikes (Griffin, 
1939).  According to estimates by the Commissioner of Labor (1888, 1896), the cost of 
these strikes between 1881 and 1894 was over $178 million in lost output and wages 
(roughly 3 billion in 2004 dollars), or $12.7 million annually (230 million 2004 dollars).  
(See Table 1.)  Strikes became a more and more source of inefficiency over the period. 
 The Commissioner of Labor classified the strikes as successes, failures, or 
compromises.  As defined by Griffin (1939), a “failed” strike is one in which the union 
largely failed to achieve its aims.  A “successful” strike is one in which the union “gained 
the major part of their expressed demands.”  Finally, a “compromise” outcome involves 
“an intermediate [outcome] in which neither side has been completely victorious.”2  
Relatively few strikes ended in compromise during this period, as shown in Figure 2.  In 
                                                          
2 Griffin (1939) cautions that “[t]he limitations inherent in such a classification must be carefully borne in 
mind.” However, Card and Olson (1995), who discuss the rarity of compromises in the 1880s, argue that 
“government statisticians and academics at the turn of the century made extensive use of the classification. 
These analysts evidently viewed the distinction between successful and failed [and compromised] strikes as 
a natural and empirically useful taxonomy.” 
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eleven of the nineteen years from 1880 to 1898, the proportion of compromise outcomes 
is below ten percent, and the average between 1881 and 1885 is less than nine percent 
(Edwards, 1981 p.42).   For the most part, then, strikes in this period had the “winner-
take-all” characteristic that Card and Olson (1995) describe. 
In terms of general economic conditions (Figure 3), the years 1880 to 1898 were 
ones of relatively high unemployment, general deflation, and relatively slow money wage 
growth (roughly half of the real wage growth during this period was due to falling 
consumer prices).  Worker bargaining power was limited.3  That weakness is indicated by 
relatively low union densities and strike activity for most of the period (Figure 4). 
 
The War of Attrition 
 Maynard Smith (1974) introduced the war of attrition as a model of fights 
between animals over territory.  Two players are fighting for a prize, which can go to 
only one of them.  Each player bears a constant cost per unit of time spent fighting.  
Every period, each player must decide whether to give up and let his opponent have the 
prize or to keep fighting in the hopes that his opponent will soon surrender.  The value of 
the prize, which may be different for the two players, is a random variable observable by 
the player himself but not by his opponent.  Alternatively, each side’s value may be 
commonly known, but a player’s cost of fighting is known only to himself.  For the 
purposes of theory, we may assume without loss of generality that only the costs are 
random: the relevant number is the ratio of the prize value to the fighting cost. 
                                                          
3 According to Kennan (1986) cross-country studies have found strike activity to be positively related to the 
inflation rate; thus deflation will tend to create a more docile labor force.  
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The war of attrition (also known as a second-price all-pay auction) has been used 
to model not only biological phenomena but also economic situations as diverse as 
market exit (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986), the provision of public goods (Bac, 1996a and 
1996b; Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1996), and marriage duration (Allen, 1994).  Kennan and 
Wilson (1989) explain how the model can be used to explain labor strikes.  In the case of 
wage strikes, the two players are the firm and the striking workers, and they fight over the 
difference between the wage offered by the firm and the wage demanded by the workers.  
Each side is imperfectly informed about the cost to the other side of allowing the strike to 
continue.  For example, the workers may not know precisely what the profits of the firm 
are in the absence of a strike, and thus may be unaware of what level of income the 
owners of the firm are forgoing while the strike continues.   The firm, on the other hand, 
may not know to what extent the workers have alternative sources of income. 
Following Nalebuff and Riley (1985), let Vf and Vw be the prize values to the firm 
and to the workers, respectively; the prize values do not  vary over time.  Let tf and tw be 
the costs per unit time of continuing the strike for the two sides.  Then vf ≡ Vf / tf and vw ≡ 
Vw / tw are the prize values normalized to be measured in units of the cost of time.  The 
values vf and vw are random variables that are not observed by the other side.  Let their 
probability distributions, which are commonly known, be denoted Pf and Pw.  A player’s 
strategy is given by a concession function mapping from normalized prize values to 
maximum holdout times; the player will allow the strike to continue until either his 
opponent yields or he reaches his maximum holdout time.  An equilibrium for this game 
is a pair of concession functions (Tf(⋅), Tw(⋅)) such that Tf(vf) maximizes the firm’s 
expected utility given vf, Tw(⋅), and Pw, and vice versa. 
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Under some conditions on the distribution functions, Nalebuff and Riley (1985) 
show that the war of attrition has a continuum of strict Nash equilibria.  However, they 
also show that the continuum is reduced to a unique equilibrium if there is a positive 
probability that either side will not ever yield.4  Since one percent (11 of  1108) of the 
strikes in the sample used here never end (in the sense that all of the striking workers 
were permanently replaced), it seems reasonable to assume that the probability that a side 
will never yield is positive, and that thus each strike has a unique equilibrium.  Each 
side’s maximum holdout time, then, is a function of its own costs and any information it 
has about the other side’s distribution of normalized prize values.  Formally, 
 
Ti = Πi(Xi, Xj, XV) + εi,           (1) 
 
where Ti is side i's maximum holdout time, Xi is a vector made up of the publicly 
observable determinants of side i's fighting cost, Xj is a vector of the publicly observable 
determinants of side i's opponent’s fighting cost, XV is a vector of publicly observable 
determinants of the prize value, and εi is an unobserved, mean zero random variable that 
corresponds to side i's private information, for i, j ∈ {f, w}, i ≠ j.  For the purposes of 
estimation, we assume that Πf and Πw are linear, so that 
 
Tf = Xf Ff + XwWf  + XVVf  + εf , and    (2a) 
 
Tw = XwWw + Xf Fw + XVVw + εw.    (2b) 
 
                                                          
4 Amann and Leininger (1996) offer a different reason to believe that a unique equilibrium will be played.  
They characterize that equilibrium as the limit of the equilibria of a class of games that converge to the war 
of attrition.  
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For the case of a symmetric war of attrition, where Pf  = Pw, Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1986) demonstrate that an increase in the prize value relative to fighting costs increases 
the maximum holdout time.  Card and Olson (1995) extend that result to a class of 
asymmetric distribution functions:  a downward shift in the distribution of one player’s 
costs increases the expectation of his maximum holdout time and decreases the 
expectation of his opponent’s.  An upward shift in the distribution of the player’s 
opponent’s cost has the same effect.5  We test the model by checking whether or not 
changes in publicly observed determinants of fighting cost move holdout times in the 
predicted direction:  Any variable that increases a side’s own cost or decreases its 
opponent’s cost should have a negative coefficient in Equations 2a and 2b; a variable that 
decreases a side’s own cost or increases its opponent’s cost should have a positive sign. 
 
Qualitative Evidence for the War of Attrition Model 
Qualitative evidence on the strategies followed by workers and firms in 1880s 
labor disputes supports the war of attrition model.  Each side had to carefully assess its 
own strength relative to that of its opponent. In giving advice to potential strikers, W.Z. 
Foster (1926 pp.32-33) emphasizes the need to “make a careful survey of … the strength 
and disposition of the enemy’s forces” in order to “gauge the strength of the enemy, to 
know … whether he is being seriously weakened or not.”  He also says that 
 
  … [t]he most powerful of all the weapons employed by the 
capitalists in ordinary strikes is that of hunger.  They seek to starve the 
                                                          
5 Note that in a complete information war of attrition, the effect is reversed:  an increase in one side’s costs 
increases the probability that it wins the prize.  See Maynard Smith (1974). 
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workers, their women and their children; to shut off their supply of life 
necessities until their courage is broken and they come back to work upon 
the employers’ terms, defeated.  (Foster, 1926 p.57) 
 
Striking workers often made explicit plans to provide themselves with income, food, and 
other necessities during a labor action.  Planning for the 1881 textile workers strike in 
Fall River, Massachusetts involved “arrang[ing] means for sustenance,” “pledges of aid 
from outside organizations,” and “contracts . . . placed for supplying the operatives with 
coal, flour, and groceries during the strike” (New York Times 1881a, 1881b, 1881e). 
Sociologist E.T. Hiller, writing in 1928, offers even stronger support for the idea of 
strikes as wars of attrition: 
 
In its most characteristic form the strike is a test of economic 
endurance  —  a process of attrition  —  in which the outcome is 
determined by the relative resources of the contestants.  The one who is 
able to hold out longer is the victor.  Therefore each party watches closely 
every move and every sign of weakening which may serve as an indication 
of the strength and endurance of his opponent … . 
Settlement by exhaustion implies that one or both parties are 
exhausted or prefer to surrender because defeat seems imminent.  Each 
estimates the limits of his resources as compared with those of his 
opponent and gauges his own inevitable losses against possible gains.  
(Hiller, 1928 pp.195, 198) 
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Summer (1914) says that a strike “simply aims to see who can stand it the longest” 
(quoted in Hiller, 1928 p.193).  Newspaper accounts from the 1880s paint a similar 
picture.  To choose one example, as a strike by glassblowers in Pittsburgh began in 1883, 
the New York Times (1883d) reported that “a manufacturer said the question was now one 
of endurance, and he thought the best filled pocket-books would win in the end.  The men 
say they are prepared to hold out until the manufacturers give in.” 
 In a war of attrition, not just a side’s own ability to endure matters, but also its 
estimate of the other side’s endurance.  Thus, workers try to convince the firm that they 
suffer little from the strike and that they can hold out indefinitely, so that the firm should 
surrender right away rather than hold out longer and then lose anyway.  The firms, of 
course, try to convince the workers of the opposite.  That pattern shows up in the 
newspaper as well.  An official at an iron mill in Chicago said of an imminent strike in 
1883, “Of course we are in better shape to stand a two months’ shut down than the men 
are. … A few months of enforced idleness is generally something of a severe trial to the 
bulk of ordinary workmen” (New York Times 1883b).  That same year, the manager of a 
Western Union office in St. Louis claimed to be experiencing no difficulties from a 
telegraphers’ strike:  “everything is going along here smoothly and well” (New York 
Times 1883c).  Also in 1883, railroad coal miners struck in Pittsburgh.  Coal company 
owners “profess to be indifferent to how long the strike lasts.”  One claimed that, “As 
good luck would have it, our contracts were not closed before the present agitation 
started, and the strike now finds us prepared to shut up the mines and take things easy 
until next Fall. … So let the miners go it; they can get all the strike they want.”  For their 
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part, the miners said of the strike, “Everything is going on swimmingly,” and insisted 
“that the operators’ statements are the veriest buncombe, and that they are exceedingly 
anxious that work should be continued” (New York Times 1883a). 
 Measures taken by workers and firms to influence the other side’s cost of holding 
out are also consistent with the war of attrition.  Workers might time strikes or adjust 
tactics to inflict maximum damage to firms in order to reduce their ability to take a long 
strike.  One example of this tactic was the planning for the aforementioned Fall River 
strike. The New York Times (1881d) reported in February that “. . . the strike will not take 
place this month, and possibly not before April 1, the operatives hoping that by that time 
goods may have advanced [in price] . . . when, if there were any sign of permanency in 
prices, manufacturers would probably advance wages voluntarily.”  A Newark, New 
Jersey strike of construction workers in March 1881 provides another example.  
“Building is very brisk at present,” one report stated, “so that the strike comes at an 
inopportune time for the bosses” (New York Times 1881f).  New York City streetcar 
drivers employed this strategy in April 1881; they believed there was “…  no doubt that 
[the strike] would compel the company to come to terms.  The present time is regarded 
… as the best in which to make the attempt to cripple the company, because the spring 
business is at its height” (New York Times 1881h).  A mine operator in Ohio “would not 
have dared to let my men know of it” if he received a large order, for fear that the miners 
would see a good chance to strike (Bemis, 1888 p.34).  Strategies for increasing costs 
borne by firms include attempts to prevent replacement workers from taking strikers’ 
jobs, secondary strikes by workers in other occupations in response to employer 
provocations, and organized boycotts of struck firms.  At an 1881 strike of Cincinnati 
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newspaper printers, for example, sympathetic members of other trade unions agreed to 
“work to lessen the advertising and subscription patronage” of the paper involved (New 
York Times 1881c).  During the Fall River strike, the Times (1881g) reported that the 
strike organizers “are making determined efforts to prevent the places of the striking 
spinners … from being filled,” that “a watch is kept to prevent help being brought to the 
mill,” and that “notices have been sent to every city where print cloths are manufactured 
… warning the operatives to stay away from the city.” 
Contemporary accounts also emphasize a general unwillingness to compromise 
on the part of both workers and firms.  The official at the iron mill in Chicago was asked, 
“Would it not be possible to effect a compromise?,” and answered, “No.  The terms are:  
The scale price or nothing.  The men are bound by cast-iron laws and must follow the 
instructions from head-quarters, so that there is nothing left for the employers to do but to 
either accept or decline.  We decline.”  Another official said, “There have been no 
negotiations between the workmen and myself” (New York Times 1883b).  In St. Louis, 
“There is no talk of compromise here on either side” (New York Times 1883c).  The 
Pittsburgh glassblowers “rejected the proposed reduction [in wages], and the 
manufacturers refused to offer any other terms.  The strike will, therefore, go on 
indefinitely” (New York Times 1883d). 
The rarity of compromises provides further evidence for the war of attrition 
model.  In that model, the parties cannot negotiate during the strike.  A fuller model 
might allow the sides the option to communicate.  However, neither contestant would 
offer a compromise if such an action signaled doubts about its ability to endure a lengthy 
strike.  Hiller (1928, p.197) says that “[a]n offer by one party to settle or to make 
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concessions is interpreted by the other as a sign of weakness.”  As Cross (1969 p.93) puts 
it, 
 
… if one of the negotiators or an ally of his were to suggest an 
“arbitrated” outcome, that party thereby would run the risk of appearing 
very anxious to reach agreement, and even willing to make large 
concessions to do so.  The likely result would be a hardening of the other 
party’s position rather than an early settlement.  It is by nature impossible 
to make a “move” during the bargaining process without having it react 
upon the expectations of the opponent. 
 
That effect is also illustrated in the newspaper.  During a strike by brass workers at Peck 
Brothers’ foundry in New Haven in 1886, “John J. Caville, from the Knights of Labor, 
called on A.T. Foster, President of the Manufacturers’ Association, to talk about terms of 
a compromise.”  Mr. Foster replied that “[t]he only thing Peck Brothers could consent to 
… was for the workmen to go back to their work unconditionally,” and that “no 
compromise whatever could be accepted.”  Later that same day, the strikers surrendered, 
and Mr. Caville “issued the order for the men to return to work” (New York Times 
1886b).  At a strike by cigar makers in New York City in 1886, workers tried to avoid the 
bad signal sent by an offer to compromise, as shown by the reaction of the International 
Union Strike Committee to the news that two other unions involved had “waited on the 
Executive Committee of the United Cigar Manufacturers’ Association in the afternoon 
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and declared their readiness to enter into negotiations with a view to a compromise.”  The 
International Union Strike Committee 
 
… condemned the action of the Progressive and Central Labor 
Unions as treacherous to the cause of labor and especially to the cigar 
makers, and recorded an emphatic protest against any agreement entered 
into by them.  Finally the old scale of prices was insisted upon and any 
compromise leading to a reduction of wages was repudiated.  (New York 
Times 1886a) 
 
During the 1881 Fall River textile workers’ strike,  
 
… the spinners . . . took umbrage . . . . at an item which appeared 
in the Fall River Herald, which claims to be an organ of the operatives, 
stating that the union would compromise the difficulty if wages were 
advanced 5 percent . . . Secretary Howard [of the spinners’ union] said the 
statement was made without his authority, and promises to secure its 
denial (New York Times 1881d). 
 
These strategies – careful assessment of own and opponents’ ability to endure a 
long strike; attempts to influence the beliefs of the other side regarding one’s own ability 
to endure; efforts to shift the relative costs of striking in one’s own favor; and an 




 The data, which are summarized in Tables 2 and 3, come from three sources:  the 
Third Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor (1888) provided by Janet Currie and 
Joseph Ferrie, the state-level samples of the 1880 Census of Manufactures constructed by 
Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman, and the sample of the 1880 Census of Population from 
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series at the University of Minnesota. 
 The Third Report represents the attempt of the Bureau of Labor to gather 
information on every strike in the United States from 1881 to 1886 (Edwards, 1981).  
Currie and Ferrie’s data set includes strikes from thirteen states.  Those states, drawn 
from the Midwest, New England, and the Middle Atlantic region, were selected because 
almost 90% of the strikes recorded by the Bureau of Labor between 1881 and 1894 
occurred in them (Currie and Ferrie, 2000).6  Each observation includes data on the date, 
location, cause, and duration of the strike; the industry of the affected firm; the pre- and 
post-strike average daily wages; the total number of employees, male and female; the 
fraction of employees striking; whether or not replacement workers were used; and 
whether or not the strike succeeded, among other variables.  Note that the use of 
replacement workers does not imply that the workers lost the strike.  Often, the 
replacements were imperfect substitutes for the striking workers, and were intended to be 
used only temporarily.  Ehrlich (1974 p.533) reports that firms  
 
generally found that they could ill afford the luxury of employing  
                                                          
6 The Tenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor (1896) includes data on strikes from 1887 to 
1894.  Unlike the Third Report, however, it does not include observations of pre- and post-strike 
employment or wages, so it cannot be used to estimate the model in this paper. 
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unskilled transient labor.  The owner of a Scotdale, Pennsylvania iron mill 
evidently learned this lesson the hard way.  After introducing a hastily 
assembled group of unskilled scabs into the plant, wastage and equipment 
damage evidently rose to such proportions that Scotdale was regularly 
referred to as “Scrapdale” …. 
 
In the 1884 Hocking Valley coal strike, the productivity of strikebreakers was less than 
half the normal level, and after accounting for the costs of “recruiting, transporting, 
guarding and training the strikebreakers,” the owners made no profit at all (Lozier, 1963 
p.62). 
 Although the Bureau of Labor went to great effort to document every strike, it 
apparently did not succeed.  Bailey (1991) reports that the Third Report and the later 
Tenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor (1896) list only half of the strikes in 
Terre Haute, Indiana that were mentioned in local newspapers from January 1, 1881 to 
June 30, 1894.7  He finds “little pattern to the exclusion of strikes in these reports,” which 
suggests that there is no selection problem, but he warns that the reports may give “a 
distorted picture” (Bailey, 1991 pp. 438, 440).  Another concern is the possible 
endogeneity of the fraction of employees striking and the use of replacement workers.  
As Card and Olson (1995 p.50) point out, “a larger fraction of workers may have been 
willing to participate in strikes that were perceived as likely to succeed.”  Similarly, a 
firm that intends never to surrender might replace all of its workers.  Attempts to 
instrument for the two variables are described below. 
                                                          
7 The true costs of the strikes, then, is likely even higher than Table 1 reports. 
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 In order to be able to quantify the value of the “prize,” we have included only 
strikes over wages.  In those cases, the size of the disputed wage change being fought 
over is a measure of the prize.  Roughly 48 percent (2113 out of 4410) of the strikes in 
the data set list the cause of the strike as either “for an increase in wages” or “against a 
decrease in wages.”  The rest of the strikes, where the strikers had goals such as 
achieving changes in working hours or conditions, preventing the hiring or firing of 
certain individuals, being paid overdue wages, or supporting a strike elsewhere, are 
dropped.  Since the agents of the Commissioner of Labor recorded only actual pre- and 
post-strike wages, the proposed change in wages is not observed if the side opposing the 
change wins the strike.  Thus, only pro-increase strikes won by the workers and anti-
decrease strikes won by the firms are useable.  1108 of the 2113 wage strikes (53 percent) 
fall into one of those two categories.  Note that this method of selection generates a 
biased sample, since there are many more strikes for increases than against decreases.  
For the 1108 strikes remaining in the sample, we construct two different measures of the 
“prize.”  The first is the absolute value of the difference between the pre- and post-strike 
wages; the second is that absolute value multiplied by the number of pre-strike 
employees.  The first measure of the prize may have more relevance for the workers, and 
the second for the firms.  Specifying the prize value this way requires that each side’s 
optimal holdout time depends only on the magnitude of the proposed change, and not on 
its sign.  That is, it assumes that there is no difference between a strike for a wage 
increase and one against a wage decrease of the same amount.  It is not obvious that that 
assumption is accurate.  Table 2 shows, for example, that unsuccessful strikes against 
wage decreases tended to last longer and occur at larger firms than successful strikes for 
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wage increases, and that they were more likely to involve strike breakers.  In this model, 
however, identification depends on that assumption, and so it will be maintained.  Of 
course, the empirical results are (at best) only as reliable as the assumption.  A related 
concern is that the prize value may be endogenous – for example, the workers may 
demand the wage increase that maximizes their probability of winning the strike. 
 The Third Report classifies 1873 of the strikes over wages (89 percent) as either 
successes for the workers or failures; the remaining 11 percent are “partial successes.”  
We recode partially successful strikes for wage increases as successes if the post-strike 
wage is at least ten cents higher than the pre-strike wage – half the mean wage increase in 
successful strikes.  Similarly, we re-classify partially successful strikes against wage 
decreases as successes if the new wage is no more than ten cents lower than the old wage.  
Of the 237 “partial successes,” 124 are changed to successes and the rest to failures. 
 For only 623 of the 1108 useable observations (56 percent) in Currie and Ferrie’s 
data set have the names of the cities where the strikes took place been coded.  An 
examination of the manuscript source suggests that that the names of only the larger cities 
and towns were recorded.  New York and Massachusetts are exceptions:  In those two 
states, the city name is recorded for every strike.  In an attempt to make the data set 
consistent, we have removed the names of cities in New York and Massachusetts where 
fewer than two strikes are observed.  After those changes, 594 of the observations (54 
percent) contain both the city and the state; the remainder have only the name of the state. 
 To measure the value to a firm of forgone output during a strike, the fraction of 
employees striking, the dollar value of annual output, and the capital-labor ratio are used.  
Together, these variables are intended to measure what the firm is losing by having a 
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fraction of its labor force not at work.  The greater the value of output, and the greater the 
fraction of that output attributable to the striking workers (that is, the greater the fraction 
striking and the lower the capital-labor ratio), the greater the cost to the firm of enduring 
a strike.8  Output values and capital-labor ratios, not included in the Third Report, are 
constructed from the Census of Manufactures.  Ideally, each firm in the Third Report 
would be matched up with its entry in the Census of Manufactures.  However, the Atack-
Bateman data are only samples of the Census; they do not include every establishment.  
Also, the Third Report does not include the names of the firms involved in strikes.  In the 
absence of the ideal measure, industry- and location-specific averages are used.  Where 
possible, county-level averages are used; when the city name is not available, state-level 
averages are used.  In either case, firms with fewer than five employees (which are 
unlikely to suffer strikes) are excluded from the averages.  For 34 strikes, state-level 
averages are used even though the city is known, because the Census of Manufactures 
sample does not include any firms with five or more workers in the relevant city-industry 
combination.  A drawback of this approach is that the Census of Manufactures does not 
cover mining, quarrying, or transportation industries.  Those three industries, which 
represent 29 percent (326 of 1108) of the sample, are lumped into “miscellaneous.”  
Overall, 46 percent (509) of the strikes in the sample are classified as occurring in 
“miscellaneous industries,” including 119 strikes where no industry is recorded. 
 The Census of Manufactures is also the source for the average wage paid to  
                                                          
8 A high capital-labor ratio might also reflect the installation of new technology that reduces the firm’s 
reliance on skilled labor, and in that way makes holding out easier.  Alternatively, a high ratio may imply a 
high level of fixed costs in production, and thus a high cost of enduring a strike.  We believe, though, that 
in estimation some of that effect may be captured by the output value and pre-strike wage variables, and 
thus that our original explanation for the role of the capital-labor ratio is likely to be valid.  (We are grateful 
to a referee for raising these possibilities.) 
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unskilled workers, which serves as a measure of the alternatives available to striking  
workers.  The average unskilled wage across firms, weighted by the number of 
employees, is calculated for each city and state.  The pre-strike wage, taken from the 
Third Report, is a measure of what the workers are giving up by striking.  The other 
measure of alternatives for striking workers is the local unemployment rate.  That 
variable is constructed from the Census of Population microsample at the city or state 
level as the average number of months unemployed in the last year among unskilled non-
agricultural workers.  (“Unskilled non-agricultural workers” are those with an occupation 
code less than 59 in the 1880 census occupational classification system.)  The Census of 
Population also gives the fractions of immigrants and non-whites in the area, which will 
be used to instrument for the use of replacement workers. 
 Currie and Ferrie (2000) provide the dates when unions were legalized in each 
state in the sample, ranging from 1869 to 1900 or later.  The legislation in New Jersey, 
New York, and Pennsylvania was enacted before 1881; Maryland and Michigan legalized 
unions during the sample period, Maryland in April 1884 and Michigan in June 1883.  
An alternative measure of whether workers have attained the right to bargain collectively 
is whether there has been a previous successful strike (over any issue, not just wages) in 
the same industry and location. 
 Finally, strikes that occur in warm weather may be easier for strikers to endure, so 
we create a dummy for strikes beginning in the second or third quarter. 
 To reiterate:  There are two measures of the prize, the size of the proposed wage 
change and the size of the proposed change in the wage bill.  The observed determinants 
of the cost of striking to the workers are their pre-strike wage, the local unemployment 
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rate, the local unskilled wage rate, and the time of year.  The determinants of the cost to 
employers are the fraction of employees on strike, the value of output, and the capital to 
labor ratio.  The two measures of union recognition may also influence the value of 
winning the strike.  That is, if winning gains workers not only a higher wage, but also the 
right to strike (and avoiding that outcome benefits the firm), then whether or not that right 
has already been established matters. 
 
Estimation 
The parameters of equations 2a and 2b will be estimated in two different ways:  
estimating the probability of success (Tf < Tw) and estimating the duration of the strikes 
(min{Tf , Tw}).  The data set contains disproportionately many successful strikes.  Since 
only successful strikes for wage increases and unsuccessful strikes against wage 
decreases are selected, and because there are considerably more strikes for increases than 
against decreases in the Third Report, a successful strike is more likely to be selected into 
the sample than an unsuccessful one.  The data are weighted to correct for the resulting 
upward bias of estimated success probabilities.  The method of weighting varies with the 
method of estimation. 
 
Probability of Success:  We estimate success probabilities in three ways, the probit 
method, linear regression, and nonparametric kernel estimation.  The third method 
requires fewer assumptions than the other two. 
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Probit:  The firm wins the strike if and only if Tf > Tw; the workers win if and only if Tf < 
Tw.  (If εf and εw have continuous distributions, a tie is a probability zero event.)  The 
probability that the workers win, therefore, is 
 
Pr[Tf < Tw] =  Pr[u < XwW + Xf F + XVV],            (3) 
 
 
where u ≡ εf − εw, W ≡ Ww − Wf , F ≡ Fw − Ff , and V ≡ Vw − Vf.  If the random variable u 
is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ and is independent of the 
explanatory variables Xw, Xf, and XV, then Equation 3 reduces to 
 
Pr[Tf < Tw] = Φ(J / σ),    (4) 
 
where J ≡ XwW + Xf F + XVV and Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function.  Equation 4 is the usual probit specification.  (See, for example, Johnston and 
DiNardo, 1997.) 
 Under the null hypothesis that the war of attrition model is correct, the elements 
of the coefficient vectors W and F should have the same sign as the corresponding 
elements of Ww and Fw :  Suppose, for example, that an increase in variable j decreases 
workers’ costs.  Then Wwj will be positive, and Wfj will be negative, so Wj ≡ Wwj − Wfj is 
also positive.  If increasing variable j results in an increase in workers’ costs, on the other 
hand, then Wwj will be negative, Wfj  will be positive, and Wj will also be negative.  Thus, 
we can test the validity of the war of attrition model by estimating Equation 4, even 
though the individual coefficients Ww, Fw, Wf, and Ff are not identified.  The model does 
not pin down the sign of V.  Because an increase in the value of the prize tends to 
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increase both sides’ holdout times, the signs of Vw and Vf are the same, so the sign of V ≡ 
Vw − Vf is indeterminate. 
 To avoid the selection bias discussed above, the data are weighted as follows:  Of 
the 2113 strikes over wages in the Third Report, 1506 are for an increase and 607 are 
against a decrease.  That means that a successful strike makes it into the sample with 
probability 1506/2113 (71.3%), and an unsuccessful strike is included with probability 
607/2113 (28.7%).  The inverses of those probabilities are the weights assigned to 
observations of successful and unsuccessful strikes, respectively. 
 
Linear Regression:  The probability that the workers win the strike can also be modeled 
as a linear function of the explanatory variables, plus an unobserved term e, which is 
independent of the explanatory variables and has mean zero: 
 
 Pr[Tf < Tw] = XwW OLS+ Xf FOLS + XVVOLS + e.           (5) 
 
The predicted signs of the coefficient vectors are the same as in probit estimation.  The 
weighting method to adjust for selection bias is also the same.  
 
Nonparametric Kernel Estimation:   The nonparametric kernel method is a way to 
estimate a version of Equation 3 without assuming that holdout times are linear in the 
covariates.  The estimated value of the dependent variable evaluated at a fixed vector of 
explanatory variables X0 is the weighted average of the realizations of the dependent 
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where N is the number of observations, y is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the workers 
won the strike, X is the vector of explanatory variables, and w(⋅) is the kernel, which 
weights the observations according to their distance from X0.  The kernel used here is the 
density function of a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 0.195.  The value 
0.195 is the cross-validated bandwidth, which minimizes the sum of squared prediction 
errors when the predicted probability for each Xi is calculated excluding observation i. 
 Because of the sample selection problem, each predicted probability )(ˆ 0Xy  is 
biased upward.  Assume that the true probability that a strike succeeds is α.  Then 
because a successful strike makes it into the sample with probability 1506/2113, and an 
unsuccessful strike is included with probability 607/2113, the probability of success in 











.  Inverting that relationship yields α = 607/(1506 
− 899p).  Thus, the estimated success probability )(ˆ 0Xy  must be modified as follows to 







=  .    (6) 
 
 This method of estimation relaxes the assumption that holdout times are a linear 
function of the independent variables, so the war of attrition model cannot be tested 
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simply by checking the signs of coefficients.  Instead, kernel estimates of Equation 6 will 
be used to measure the average derivatives of success probability with respect to the 
explanatory variables.  The average derivative over the 10th- to 90th-percentile range of 
variable Xj is estimated as follows:  PHj is the estimated success probability evaluated at 
the 90th-percentile of Xj (Xj90) and the means of the other variables, and PLj is the 
estimated success probability evaluated at the 10th-percentile of Xj (Xj10) and the means 
of the other variables.  The average derivative is calculated as (PHj − PLj) / (Xj90 − Xj10). 
 
Strike Duration:  The length of the strike is the minimum of the two holdout times.  The 
war of attrition model predicts that duration increases with the value of the prize.  It also 
predicts that if one side is perceived to have significantly lower costs, then the other side 
is likely to give in quickly.  Conversely, if the two sides are evenly matched, then the 
strike is likely to be dragged out.  Both predictions are tested using linear regression.  We 
use the predicted success probability from probit estimation as our measure of whether or 
not the strike is closely contested.  Weighting is as with the probit. 
 
Results 
 The results from applying the procedures described in the previous section to the 
data are shown in Table 4.  Columns 1 and 2 present the results of linear and probit 
estimation of Equation 4 and 5, where the explanatory variables are the pre-strike wage 
(WAGE_PRE), the fraction of employees striking (FRACOUT), the average wage to 
unskilled labor in the region (USKILL_W), the firm’s capital-labor ratio (KLRATIO), 
the value of the firm’s output (OUTPUT_V), the local unemployment rate (MUE), 
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whether unions were recognized (PREV and LEGAL, as well as the interaction 
PREVLEG), whether the strike began in the spring or summer (Q2Q3), and the two 
measures of the prize value.  (The absolute value of the wage change is PRIZE1; PRIZE2 
is PRIZE1 multiplied by the number of pre-strike employees.)  Also included are regional 
dummy variables for the Midwest (MW=1 for strikes in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and 
Ohio) and New England (NE=1 in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine and New 
Hampshire).  The excluded region is the Middle Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland, New 
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania).9 
 In preliminary estimates, the fraction striking (FRACOUT) and the use of 
replacement workers were instrumented for, using the fraction of female employees and 
the fraction of immigrants and non-whites (the usual sources of strikebreakers) in the 
local population.  The magnitude on the FRACOUT coefficient increased (as did the 
standard deviations), suggesting that the concern that more employees join in strikes that 
seem likely to succeed, thus biasing the coefficient upward, can be ignored.  The 
coefficient on the use of replacements, on the other hand, moves from significantly 
negative to smaller in magnitude and insignificant.  Our interpretation is that all firms had 
the opportunity to hire replacements.  Whether or not they were used does not affect the 
firm’s cost, but instead reflects the firm’s belief about the eventual outcome.  
Consequently, in the reported regressions below we include FRACOUT without 
instruments and exclude the variable indicating the use of replacements. 
The war of attrition model predicts that the coefficients on the variables that 
increase the workers’ cost of striking (WAGE_PRE and MUE) or decrease the firm’s 
                                                          
9 We also tried alternative specifications, such as entering the two prize variables one at a time, and 
including a time trend.  The results changed very little. 
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cost of enduring a strike (KLRATIO) should be negative.  The coefficients on variables 
that decrease the workers’ cost (USKILL_W and Q2Q3) or increases the firm’s 
(FRACOUT and OUTPUT_V) should be positive.  The model makes no prediction about 
the effect of the prize value or the regional and union recognition dummy variables. 
 All of the estimated coefficients in Columns 1 and 2 have the predicted sign, and 
six of them (FRACOUT, USKILL_W, KLRATIO, OUTPUT_V,10 MUE, and Q2Q3) are 
significant at the one-percent level in both regressions.  The coefficient on WAGE_PRE 
is significant at the five-percent level in the linear regression and at the ten-percent level 
in the probit specification.  The null hypothesis that the war of attrition is the correct 
model of wage strikes in the 1880s is not rejected by linear or probit estimation.11 
 Column 3 presents the average derivatives of strike success probabilities with 
respect to the explanatory variables estimated nonparametrically.  A 95-percent 
confidence interval for each average derivative is constructed from 100 bootstrap 
samples.  The results are generally consistent with the probit results, although several of 
the estimated derivatives are considerably smaller in magnitude than the probit estimates.  
All of the estimated derivatives have the predicted sign, and six of them (FRACOUT, 
                                                          
10 For the 46 percent of the strikes in the sample occurring in “miscellaneous industries,” KLRATIO and 
OUTPUT_V are constructed from location-specific but not industry-specific averages.  That construction 
may generate excessive noise in estimation, so we re-do the linear regression of strike success in Table 4, 
including a dummy variable for “miscellaneous industry” and interactions between the dummy and 
KLRATIO and OUTPUT_V.  The new estimates remain consistent with the war of attrition, although the 
coefficients on both KLRATIO and OUTPUT_V are reduced in magnitude.  The noise in the constructed 
variables does not qualitatively affect the results, but there is a quantitative impact, and so the estimated 
effects of the two industry variables on strike outcomes must be interpreted with caution. 
11 To address concerns about the omission of so many observations (we drop 1001 of 2109 wage strikes 
because the prize is not observed), we re-estimate the linear regression of strike success in Table 4 without 
the explanatory variables PRIZE1 and PRIZE2, and then use the estimated coefficients to generate 
predicted success probabilities for all 2109 wage strikes.  The mean predicted probabilities of success for 
successful and failed pro-increase strikes are 53.2 percent and 49.2 percent, respectively.  The means for 
successful and failed anti-decrease strikes are 45.2 percent and 38.3.  The finding that workers were in a 
weaker position in both pro-increase and anti-decrease strikes that they in fact went on to lose suggests that 
the exclusion of so much of the data set does not qualitatively affect our conclusions. 
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USKILL_W, KLRATIO, OUTPUT_V, MUE, and Q2Q3) are significantly different from 
zero at the five-percent level.  Nonparametric estimation of average derivatives, like 
probit and linear probability estimation, does not reject the hypothesis that the data fit the 
war of attrition model.12 
 The results of a linear regression of strike duration on the two measures of the 
prize value and other covariates are given in Column 4.  The coefficients on both PRIZE1 
and PRIZE2 are positive, and the one on PRIZE2 (the absolute value of the wage change 
times the number of employees) is greater than zero at the one-percent significance level, 
which is consistent with the prediction of the war of attrition model.  The coefficient on 
the dummy variable CLOSE10 (which equals 1 if the predicted success probability from 
the probit regression is between .4 and .6, indicating that the sides are evenly matched) is 
positive, as the model predicts, and significant at the five-percent level.13  The 
coefficients on the two union recognition dummies, PREV and LEGAL, are both 
negative, and the latter is significant at the one-percent level, which supports the idea that 
part of the prize at stake in the strikes is whether or not workers can establish their right 
to bargain collectively: strikes are shorter if that issue has been settled previously.  Also 
consistent with that story is the fact that the coefficient on the interaction term, 
PREVLEG, is positive (although not quite significant at even the ten-percent level).  
Once the right to bargain has been established by either legislation or a successful strike, 
re-establishing it another way has little effect. 
                                                          
12 As described earlier, an alternative theoretical interpretation of the effect of a higher capital-labor ratio is 
that it increases rather than decreases the firm’s cost of holding out.  In that case, the predicted coefficient 
of KLRATIO in Columns 1 through 3 is positive, and all three estimates would reject the war of attrition 
model. 
13 Other ways of defining the “closeness” of a strike yield similar results, as does using the log of duration 




 The main game-theoretic alternatives to the war of attrition model are models of 
signaling and screening (Kennan and Wilson, 1989).  In those models, only one side 
lacks information about the other, as opposed to the war of attrition, where both sides are 
hampered by uncertainty.  Usually, the firms are modeled as being of different “types”:  
some have high profits and can afford to pay high wages, and some have low profits and 
can only afford low wages.  Each firm knows its own type.  Its workers, who are ignorant 
of the firm’s type, begin by demanding a high wage.  The firm can convince the workers 
that it cannot afford to pay such high wages (that it is a “low” type) only by showing that 
it would rather suffer the cost of a strike than pay.  The lower the profits of the firm, the 
lower are its costs of enduring a strike and the greater its difficulty in paying a high wage.  
These discrimination models imply that the post-strike wage should decrease 
monotonically as the duration of the strike increases.  The wage that the workers are 
willing to accept is lower after each day of the strike, because only lower type firms are 
willing to endure longer strikes in order to pay a lower wage.  The strike lasts until the 
savings from the additional decrease in the workers’ wage demand from one more day of 
a strike is less than or equal to the firm’s cost of enduring another day, at which point it is 
optimal for the firm to agree to the employees’ demands and end the strike. 
In a variation on those models, it is the workers who are of different types, in the 
sense of having different outside options.  In that case, the post-strike wage should 
increase with strike duration, as firms become convinced that the workers are of the “high 
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outside option” type.  A key characteristic of the one-sided incomplete information 
models of strikes is that wage outcomes vary monotonically with strike duration. 
Column 5 of Table 4 presents the results of ordinary least squares regression of 
post-strike wage on duration, squared duration, and other covariates.  The sample used in 
the regressions in Column 5 includes all 2113 strikes over wages before 1887 in Currie 
and Ferrie’s data set, regardless of which side won (except for four strikes where the 
post-strike wage is not recorded).  According to the estimates, the post-strike wage is 
decreasing with duration for the first 300 days, and increasing thereafter.  That result is 
inconsistent with a model in which workers are signaling their type to the firms.  Because 
only 8 out of 2109 strikes in the sample lasted longer than 300 days, the data do not show 
conclusively that post-strike wages are not decreasing with duration, which would rule 
out models where it is the firm’s type that is unknown.  However, the estimated 
magnitude of the derivative of the post-strike wage with respect to duration seems to be 
inconsistent with such screening models.  By enduring an additional day of a strike, a 
firm can reduce the daily wage by less than 0.14 cents.  The average number of 
employees in the sample is 336, and the average annual value of output is $88,369.  If the 
firm loses 1/365 of its annual output for each day of a strike, those figures imply that it 
will take over 16 months of seven-day work weeks for the average firm to recover in 
wages what it loses in output from an additional day of a strike.  For the median firm, the 
figure is over 34 months.  Of course, it is unlikely that a firm loses all of its output during 
a strike, but even if the true figures are only a fraction of the ones estimated, it appears 
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that the marginal cost to a firm of enduring one more day is far greater than the marginal 
gain.  That result suggests that the data do not fit a screening model of strikes.14 
Also, if there is uncertainty only about the firm’s profitability and not about the 
workers’ costs of enduring a strike, then the workers have no reason to signal their 
willingness to hold out longer.  The qualititative evidence presented earlier of employees 
trying to display their ability to hold out is thus inconsistent with screening.  
Analogously, firms’ attempts to downplay their costs of a strike do not fit the signaling 
model.  Empirically, determinants of strike costs for both sides influence strike outcomes, 
suggesting that signaling and screening models, or any other model that relies on one-
sided uncertainty, cannot explain the data.  (The war of attrition, in contrast, posits two-
sided asymmetric information.)  Finally, the rarity of compromises seems to rule out 
signaling and screening models, in which the parties’ offers and demands change over 
time. 
Other alternatives to the war of attrition are models in which the sides can 
communicate with each other during the strike, modify their demands, and reach a 
compromise solution.  It is difficult to tell from the data whether or not the sides were 
negotiating with each other, since only the final agreed-upon wage is reported.  Most 
likely, firms and workers were bargaining with each other in at least a few of the strikes 
in the sample.  Overall, though, the low proportion of strike outcomes that the 
Commissioner of Labor’s agents classified as compromises and the historical evidence 
presented earlier suggest that such negotiation was rare. 
                                                          
14 A similar “rationality” criterion is not appropriate to test the war of attrition model.  The reason is the 
payoff discontinuity in the war of attrition: conceding one second before rather than one second after the 
other side yields a much lower payoff, and so marginal analysis does not apply.  The signaling model, on 
the other hand, predicts a smooth change in wage as time passes. 
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Why Wars of Attrition? 
 Because a war of attrition imposes costs on both sides that could be avoided if the 
parties could resolve their differences through a bargaining solution, the model best fits 
situations where the two sides have opposing goals or are antagonistic (as is the case with 
competing firms, or whenever the prize in dispute is indivisible), or where negotiation is 
difficult or impossible (as in public good provision for a large population).  Relations 
between employers and employees do not usually fall into either of those categories.    
The conclusion of this paper, that the wage strikes of the 1880s have the properties of the 
war of attrition, raises a question, therefore:  What was the source of the failure in labor 
relations?  Why were firms and workers so rarely able to reach agreements through 
bargaining in the 1880s as opposed to the period from 1938-41, for example, when 36 
percent of strikes ended in compromises (Edwards, 1981 p.42)? 
 Card and Olson (1995) suggest that many of the strikes of the 1880s were in fact 
over the issue of whether firms would even recognize that their employees had the right 
to bargain at all. Selekman (1927) says that such strikes “[have] to be fought out …. 
Agreements can be reached only by the abandonment of one side or the other of the 
matter of contention, there being no ground for a common point of view” (quoted in 
Hiller, 1928 p.199).  For that interpretation to make sense, the “right to bargain” must be 
understood to include the right (or ability) to strike:  It is in a firm’s own best interest to 
bargain with workers who credibly threaten to strike.  If Card and Olson’s (1995) 
interpretation is correct, then, firms sought to win strikes in the belief that their 
employees, if defeated, would be so demoralized as to never strike again (or at least not 
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for a long time).  Commons et al. (1926, p.350) report that after a failed strike employers 
took steps to prevent workers from organizing again:  “ … the employers would 
persecute the leaders as well as the common strikers through the blacklist, and those who 
remained were compelled to sign the ‘iron-clad,’ and were constantly spied upon.”  In 
any case, the regression of strike duration in Table 4 shows that although strikes are 
shorter when union recognition has been achieved (reflected in the negative coefficients 
on PREV and LEGAL), prize value is still an important explanatory factor.  Thus, the 
right to bargain collectively may have been part of the motivation for the strikes, but it 
does not appear that the strikes were exclusively about recognition. 
 An implication of Card and Olson’s (1995) explanation is that the probability of a 
strike ending in compromise should increase after union recognition.15  To investigate, 
we regress the probability of a compromise outcome on the same set of independent 
variables used in the duration regression in Table 4.  The estimated coefficients on 
PREV, LEGAL, and PREVLEG are respectively –.111, –.132, and .134.  The coefficient 
on PREV is statistically significant at the five-percent level, and the other two at the ten-
percent level.  Thus, the data reject Card and Olson’s (1995) hypothesis – the 
establishment of collective bargaining rights reduces the likelihood of compromise by 
over ten percent.  (As in the duration regression, the coefficient on the interaction term 
PREVLEG is nearly equal in magnitude to the coefficients on PREV and LEGAL, but of 
the opposite sign: the right to bargain can only be established once.) 
 An alternative explanation of why the strikes were wars of attrition is that  
                                                          
15 Freeman (1998) similarly argues that higher union densities reduced employer resistance to organized 
labor, since as more and more firms were unionized, recognizing organized labor was less likely to put any 
single firm at a competitive disadvantage. 
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employers and employees did not negotiate because they did not trust each other to abide 
by their agreements.  The factory system of production had been introduced in the United 
States before the Civil War, but the large increase in the scale of manufacturing came 
afterward (Margo, 1992 p.28).  Not until the 1880s was the factory system in general use 
(Commons et al, 1926 p.358).  This change in the method of production resulted in 
“vastly larger” social gaps between workers and firm owners (Margo, 1992 pp.29-30).  
The willingness of owners to use violence to discourage strikers and the bodily harm 
sometimes inflicted upon strike breakers must also have contributed to an atmosphere of 
animosity and suspicion.16  The fact that written employee contracts were uncommon 
before the 1890s magnified the difficulties caused by the mutual mistrust (Margo, 1992 
p.35), and what labor contracts there were in most states were considered to be “court-
unenforceable gentlemen’s agreements” (Gould, 1993 p.31).  Whatever the reason, in 
some cases mistrust was justified.  In 1885 the Knights of Labor won a strike against Jay 
Gould’s Wabash Railroad, which reversed a wage cut for shopmen and granted 
recognition to the Knights.  Gould soon began to sabotage the agreement, however, by 
firing union officials.  In 1886, the railworkers struck again, this time unsuccessfully.  In 
May 1886, Chicago packinghouse workers won the eight-hour day (without a strike), but 
in October the meatpacking firms announced a return to the ten-hour day.  The 
subsequent lockout was a complete victory for the firms (Perlman, 1922 pp. 94-98). 
 As Figure 2 shows, after the 1880s the rate of compromise in strikes gradually 
increased, and the war of attrition model became less and less applicable for describing 
strikes.  (See Geraghty and Wiseman, 2007, for details about the rise of compromises.)   
                                                          
16 See Rosenbloom (1998) on the use of strikebreakers in these strikes. 
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Examining how strikes moved away from the costly war-of-attrition framework can also 
shed light on why the strikes of the 1880s did take that form.  Three main forces seem to 
be responsible for the transition:  changes in macroeconomic conditions, evolution of the 
structure of product markets, and a growing awareness (by firms and workers, and also 
by government and the public) of the cost of wars of attrition. 
 As described earlier, deflation and high unemployment characterized the period 
from 1800 to 1896.  Afterward, growing consumer demand and rising prices made it 
easier for firms to accept wage increases (or to forgo wage concessions from workers).  
Nominal wages, in fact, grew four times faster from 1897 to 1904 than from 1880 to 1896 
(Griffin 1939).  Table 5, which uses Freeman’s (1998) periodization of U.S. labor history 
into periods of relative stasis or equilibrium (1880-1896, 1905-1915) punctuated by 
shorter union growth spurts (1897-1904, 1916-1921, 1934-1939), shows that changes in 
the frequency of compromised strikes are positively correlated with changes in the 
inflation rate.  Intuitively, when there is a greater potential surplus, dividing it 
cooperatively is easier. 
 The same pattern shows up in looking at changes in industrial organization: with a 
larger pie, there is less incentive to fight for every bite.  At the beginning of the 1880s, 
product distribution was typically dominated by wholesalers.  The wholesalers invested 
in advertising, creating sales forces, and building networks with banks; few 
manufacturers were yet able to do the same.  Wholesalers often used their market power 
to “play off competing manufacturers against each other, producing a cutthroat 
competition, low prices, low profits, and consequently a steady and insistent pressure 
upon wages” (Commons et al., 1926 pp. 359-360).  The surplus available to 
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manufacturers and their employees was small, and compromise was rare.  By the late 
1890s, however, as the scale, scope, and market power of manufacturing enterprise 
increased, more firms were “reach[ing] out directly to the ultimate consumer, or, else, by 
means of control over patents and trademarks,” had limited the power of the wholesaler 
(Commons et al., 1926 pp. 480-482).  With the middlemen cut out of the loop, the profit 
margins of manufacturers increased, and so did the number of compromises. 
 At the extreme, though, in some industries manufacturers organized themselves 
into trusts.  A leading example is the iron and steel industry, dominated after 1900 by the 
U.S. Steel Corporation (Commons et al., 1926 pp.359-360).  In those industries, 
cooperation among firms (particularly in wage-setting) greatly reduced their costs of 
enduring strikes, and thus eliminated their incentive to compromise.  We expect, then, to 
see an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the frequency of compromise and the 
level of concentration in an industry.  The strikes in Currie and Ferrie’s dataset exhibit 
just such a relationship, as Figure 5 shows.  In particular, the industries with the lowest 
four-firm concentration ratios (printing, with a ratio of 1 percent) and with the highest 
(building, 57 percent) have compromise rates well below average: 2.9 percent and 6.8 
percent, respectively. 
 Finally, compromises became more frequent as the high costs of the war of 
attrition became more apparent.  “As a result of the increase in strikes,” argues Barnett 
(1912, pp.426-427), “a widespread movement for the peaceful settlement of the 
conditions of employment was inaugurated . . . a considerable number of employers’ 
associations formed originally for other purposes began to negotiate with the unions.”  In 
the Hocking Valley of Ohio, the “terrible destitution” of the 1884 coal miners’ strike 
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described in the introduction led miners and operators to resolve at a convention in 1885 
that, “[t]he question of what one should pay and the other receive in compensation can be 
best determined by friendly conferences, where intelligence and arbitration will take the 
place of the usual irrational and cruel methods of the past” (Bemis, 1888 pp.27-28).  One 
manifestation of that “movement for peaceful settlement” was the increased use and 
acceptance of written contracts.  Another important component was the creation by 
different levels of government of new mechanisms to resolve disputes between labor and 
management.  For example, as the New York Times (1897a) reported on the 1897 coal 
miners’ strike, 
 
The greatest interest is now manifested in the scheme to arbitrate 
the strike question.  Labor commissioners and official arbitrators of the 
several states affected are now mobilizing … .  Invitations have been sent 
to the coal operators of the Pittsburgh district to meet the arbitrators 
informally and talk over the matter of settling the strike.  … If the 
operators can be brought into line on the conference idea, there will be no 
obstacles interposed by the miners. 
 
The resulting compromise ending the strike included a wage increase less than the miners 
were originally seeking and an agreement by employers not to import new workers into 
areas affected by the strike (New York Times 1897b). 
 The ability of government to act as an impartial arbitrator is crucial in establishing 
such dispute resolution mechanisms, since once engaged in a war of attrition neither side 
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can independently propose a compromise without signaling weakness.  At the beginning 
of the 1880s, though, government was typically not perceived as impartial: It was on the 
side of business.  The famous Homestead strike of 1892, in which Carnegie Steel faced 
off against the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, and the Pullman 
strike of 1894 both failed in part after intervention by state militias and, in the latter case, 
federal troops (Perlman, 1922 pp.83-85, 97-100, 133-139; Commons et al., 1926 pp.495-
497, 502-503).  Taft (1964 p.162) suggests that the depression years of 1893 to 1898 may 
have played a role in changing public and governmental perception of organized labor: 
 
Prolonged unemployment, with its accompanying destitution and 
suffering, tarnished the reputation of business, and the public regarded, at 
least for a time, the workers’ quest for greater security and higher pay as 
justifiable.  Exposures of corporate derelictions made the demands of 
labor for some countervailing power appear reasonable. 
 
 Overall, then, it seems that wage strikes in 1880s America were wars of attrition 
because neither side trusted the other to honor agreements, because narrow profit margins 
left little room to compromise, and because neither side could unilaterally propose a 
move toward compromise.  Over time, changes in market structure and macroeconomic 
conditions, together with a push for less costly, arbitrated settlements by the public 
sector, relieved those pressures, and strikes ceased to be wars of attrition. 
 
 41
Summary and Discussion 
 It is clear that the estimated equations do not contain all the covariates that would 
ideally be included.  Most obviously, firm-specific data on revenues and capital-labor 
ratios would be an improvement.  The possibility of selection bias in the Third Report 
raised by Bailey (1991) is also a concern, as is the potential inaccuracy of the identifying 
assumption that holdout times depend only on the magnitude (and not on the sign) of the 
proposed wage change.  The limitations of the existing data set must be kept in mind 
when considering the conclusions of this paper:  Based on regressions of maximum 
holdout times and strike duration on determinants of strike costs and prize value, the 
hypothesis that the wage strikes of the 1880s fit the war of attrition model is not rejected.  
Alternative game-theoretic models of one-sided incomplete information do not fit the 
data.  The strikes took the form of wars of attrition not because they were chiefly over 
recognition of collective bargaining rights, but because of three factors:  lack of 
enforceable agreements, small surpluses to be split, and the absence of an impartial 
arbitrator. 
 The observation that the 1880s strikes were wars of attrition implies that two-
sided rather than one-sided incomplete information played an important role.  That 
bilateral uncertainty may help to explain why there were so many strikes during the 
period.  A strike, in some sense, is always a mistake.  The two sides undertake the strike 
because each believes that the outcome will make it better off.  At least one side must be 
wrong, because the costs of the strike reduce the economic surplus; in fact, a long strike 
makes even the winner worse off.  When both sides face uncertainty, then either can be 
wrong in its expectation.  Thus, when strikes are wars of attrition, there will be more of 
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them than if they fit the signaling or screening models, which feature incomplete 
information on only one side:  Two uncertain parties means twice as many chances for 
mistakes. 
 In conclusion, it is interesting to note that the three factors identified in this paper 
as leading to war-of-attrition strikes are becoming relevant again, as capital moves more 
and more freely across the world and information technology increases flexibility in 
production.  When production of a final good takes place in more than one country, it is 
not always clear which set of labor laws apply, and there is no obvious arbitrator.  Even 
worse, if a company has its headquarters in one country and its workers in another, then 
neither government is impartial in a dispute between labor and management.  Similarly, a 
firm that can easily shift a manufacturing plant to a low-wage country can avoid honoring 
its contract with a union in a high-wage country.  (See, for example, Varman and 
Chakrabarti (2003) and Piazza (2005)).  Finally, increased global competition squeezes 
the profit margins of producers.  More generally, Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Kochan (2004 
p.25) argue that “collective bargaining is being challenged by changes occurring in the 
nature of work and the economy.”  Thus, the strikes of the 21st century may again fit the 
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 Table 1 
Strike Costs  
 
Year Workers Firms Worker Firm
1881 $1,760,618 $1,057,506 $24 $866
1882 $7,289,799 $2,479,789 $79 $2,572
1883 $4,106,315 $2,407,230 $56 $1,820
1884 $5,093,905 $2,234,003 $68 $1,845
1885 $8,195,692 $2,619,137 $59 $1,898
1886 $8,571,346 $5,834,991 $33 $1,317
1887 $11,647,108 $3,964,555 $69 $1,011
1888 $5,541,202 $6,219,531 $81 $2,075
1889 $8,009,986 $1,942,858 $56 $725
1890 $11,175,405 $3,503,671 $62 $642
1891 $12,497,132 $5,160,108 $60 $772
1892 $8,899,130 $4,241,542 $78 $1,027
1893 $7,977,051 $3,170,246 $66 $801
1894 $20,478,079 $12,559,716 $103 $2,886
Total $121,242,768 $57,394,883
Average $8,660,198 $4,099,635 $64 $1,447





Year Workers Firms Worker Firm
1881 $29,280,646 $17,587,267 $398 $14,404
1882 $117,916,034 $40,111,790 $1,272 $41,610
1883 $69,160,145 $40,543,499 $943 $30,645
1884 $89,471,388 $39,238,924 $1,188 $32,402
1885 $147,346,546 $47,088,250 $1,054 $34,122
1886 $154,976,543 $105,501,135 $604 $23,804
1887 $209,977,648 $71,474,218 $1,248 $18,219
1888 $97,925,876 $109,913,521 $1,438 $36,675
1889 $141,861,450 $34,409,130 $996 $12,834
1890 $202,122,204 $63,368,594 $1,121 $11,612
1891 $226,874,900 $93,677,412 $1,093 $14,007
1892 $163,491,033 $77,923,807 $1,435 $18,863
1893 $146,496,040 $58,220,574 $1,217 $14,706
1894 $397,047,586 $243,519,176 $2,001 $55,956
Total $2,193,948,040 $1,042,577,295
Average $156,710,574 $74,469,807 $1,143 $25,704




Characteristics of Successful Strikes for Wage Increases and
Unsuccessful Strikes against Wage Decreases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean
Fraction |Change
Using Mean Mean Mean in Wage| Fraction
Fraction Strike Pre-Strike Change |Change X for Wage Median
Number on Strike Breakers Wage in Wage in Wage| # Workers Increase Duration
All Strikes 1108 0.69 0.10 1.79 0.08 0.21 63.43 0.67 11
By State
CT 73 0.25 0.04 1.49 0.06 0.09 14.59 0.82 5
DE 4 0.51 0.00 1.36 0.06 0.09 25.95 0.75 12
IL 215 0.92 0.07 2.00 0.16 0.24 59.85 0.78 7
IN 47 0.76 0.17 1.81 -0.02 0.23 60.35 0.51 14
ME 9 0.63 0.11 1.70 0.19 0.19 27.37 1.00 7
MD 18 0.92 0.22 1.62 0.04 0.26 184.86 0.61 36
MA 34 0.41 0.15 1.54 -0.16 0.26 97.24 0.18 27.5
MI 37 0.69 0.08 1.71 0.12 0.17 25.38 0.78 9
NH 4 0.23 0.00 1.55 0.06 0.12 227.90 0.75 16
NJ 55 0.78 0.02 1.84 0.15 0.23 28.98 0.75 7
NY 85 0.91 0.06 2.03 0.25 0.34 99.45 0.76 7
OH 209 0.67 0.20 1.76 0.04 0.22 69.21 0.64 14
PA 318 0.57 0.09 1.71 0.02 0.16 63.42 0.61 14
By Year
1881 155 0.73 0.09 1.91 0.16 0.21 40.98 0.86 10
1882 141 0.73 0.10 1.87 0.11 0.22 44.77 0.69 9
1883 148 0.70 0.12 1.76 0.04 0.21 67.91 0.60 14
1884 124 0.62 0.19 1.83 -0.15 0.24 127.25 0.20 14.5
1885 169 0.64 0.14 1.67 -0.01 0.18 90.44 0.44 18
1886 371 0.69 0.05 1.75 0.16 0.20 44.49 0.88 7
By Industry
1 111 0.49 0.04 1.43 0.11 0.13 43.78 0.84 7
2 79 0.73 0.11 1.87 0.12 0.19 33.63 0.72 7
3 114 0.71 0.08 1.58 0.10 0.18 12.85 0.79 14
4 204 0.48 0.15 1.86 0.06 0.16 32.59 0.67 13.5
5 14 0.56 0.21 2.11 0.14 0.25 13.56 0.71 8.5
6 77 0.74 0.12 2.13 0.17 0.25 99.90 0.87 7
7 509 0.79 0.10 1.80 0.05 0.24 91.89 0.58 12
By Cause
For Increase 746 0.71 0.06 0.21 0.21 53.46 7
Vs. Decrease 362 0.63 0.19 -0.19 0.21 83.99 24
Notes: Industry codes:  1=clothing, textiles, shoes, leather; 2=wood, glass, pottery; 3=food,
tobacco; 4=metals, machinery; 5=printing; 6=construction, building; 7=other




Employment and Industrial Characteristics, by State and City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Industry 1 Industry 2 Industry 3 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 6 Industry 7
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Unskilled Months Mean Output Mean Output Mean Output Mean Output Mean Output Mean Output Mean Output
Wage Unemp. K/L Value K/L Value K/L Value K/L Value K/L Value K/L Value K/L Value
CT 1.32 0.65 371 107522 1804 20523 1364 33825 1389 71895 930 58825 210 26022 765 87184
Bridgeport 1.35 0.31 188 70245 5240 21177 1377 11000 1626 73300 * * 124 56000 514 322600
Hartford 1.35 0.46 331 106207 943 6533 1333 26000 1377 15954 1383 104500 292 30097 1319 31383
New Haven 1.37 0.94 511 240413 1081 109624 872 32112 1562 111013 577 14000 181 12711 722 74951
DE 0.98 0.25 1184 62201 413 6957 1234 35011 863 72341 417 5000 210 19450 975 43039
IL 1.16 0.44 591 104328 544 19843 1763 290062 1012 56231 371 68250 364 43891 2521 67338
Chicago 1.29 0.37 602 146218 533 38307 649 444764 1195 51742 436 85667 259 57161 515 110083
Decatur 1.00 0.22 375 40000 * * * * * * * * * * 6908 11548
E. St. Louis 1.60 1.24 * * * * 1867 785129 * * * * 100 18000 * *
Peoria 1.24 0.44 * * 1611 16333 682 450000 1000 90000 * * 832 51500 * *
Springfield 1.18 0.56 * * 125 2000 1667 14000 * * 179 16000 1600 8926 * *
IN 1.07 0.45 794 38692 349 28012 1034 85176 777 50230 650 29000 331 8371 495 22786
Evansville 1.17 0.46 1158 46800 * * 1038 107262 * * 1034 56000 * * * *
Indianapolis 1.22 0.18 767 28500 325 159268 422 150425 922 76800 * * * * 536 47000
South Bend 1.03 0.15 * * 750 5000 * * 1171 250000 * * * * 417 7500
Terre Haute 1.19 0.39 * * 150 18000 * * * * 417 14000 * * 363 28000
ME 1.04 0.59 398 64252 583 12438 385 61590 858 21748 1078 14460 176 8967 887 11845
MD 0.99 0.58 786 45392 481 35771 991 67507 921 77730 1506 35200 583 19414 1941 56166
Baltimore 1.06 0.46 508 38437 564 46525 1181 85177 1024 111262 1201 64668 583 19414 2475 74682
MA 1.25 0.59 662 60563 702 26984 1033 133789 751 43342 623 79694 462 29830 1965 86584
Boston 1.25 0.54 364 20994 457 32558 1593 284060 691 22251 393 113160 657 42848 1003 139783
Fall River 1.29 0.84 156 31200 350 11500 707 57800 782 53032 * * 322 9666 2576 62612
Springfield 1.26 0.45 506 28667 895 42750 167 9075 495 60217 500 4000 1000 16000 1987 220000
Worcester 1.21 0.47 1094 60466 488 25431 643 30000 763 73453 * * 233 24667 * *
MI 1.17 0.39 701 114875 726 39699 2699 87098 978 19309 1736 10000 316 15798 1337 47376
Detroit 1.10 0.26 1233 365000 759 61492 3000 44600 724 53750 2941 20000 292 17046 599 60500
Grand Rapids 1.17 0.28 714 102000 774 26827 * * 625 34000 * * 171 10000 324 13000
Lansing 1.10 0.62 * * * * * * 2000 2000 1600 5000 * * 250 30350




Employment and Industrial Characteristics, by State and City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Industry 1 Industry 2 Industry 3 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 6 Industry 7
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Unskilled Months Mean Output Mean Output Mean Output Mean Output Mean Output Mean Output Mean Output
Wage Unemp. K/L Value K/L Value K/L Value K/L Value K/L Value K/L Value K/L Value
NJ 1.12 0.52 416 116456 735 12410 1804 174602 628 44300 1015 81598 352 17878 1181 48551
Camden 1.18 0.28 * * 750 7000 * * 1321 21250 * * * * * *
Jersey City 1.39 0.09 83 4500 533 17000 1024 517714 348 15362 * * 195 23625 929 52500
Newark 1.17 0.79 578 102872 606 9748 2044 31000 417 22096 1019 118667 420 17264 904 84187
Paterson 1.17 0.30 250 220204 438 12000 * * 788 320422 1017 41988 * * 444 15500
Trenton 1.15 0.12 86 23500 714 19400 2599 270859 1228 11333 * * 56 9850 881 27500
NY 1.09 0.34 754 94212 641 24490 1896 116407 873 63988 938 53250 588 21659 968 27765
Amsterdam 1.06 0.98 * * * * 500 10000 * * * * * * 986 97000
Brooklyn 1.38 0.24 1478 56501 1048 47597 924 23589 654 38099 353 28690 394 10669 1419 25210
Cohoes 1.50 0.38 * * * * 8333 193000 * * * * * * * *
New York City 1.30 0.27 700 117905 508 22850 1573 294983 784 138948 1110 73093 913 33882 494 41906
Troy 1.18 0.23 90 470000 441 10000 545 22190 1372 68750 500 4500 210 18250 606 5388
OH 1.03 0.56 520 25063 475 14234 1625 38385 857 30121 917 75062 318 12522 1234 27924
Akron 1.22 0.45 * * 438 17467 3000 24000 253 13000 700 8500 1429 45000 1889 28090
Cincinnati 1.02 0.26 591 34642 524 22260 2064 45283 477 44221 1224 124865 438 16309 1436 41815
Cleveland 1.22 0.64 508 26807 523 17520 865 23820 1372 37521 250 9600 248 8717 7037 138250
Columbus 0.95 0.74 188 5100 408 37153 * * 1835 54113 19 8000 304 11371 * *
Dayton 1.21 1.49 500 13000 528 10221 3000 27900 919 38401 1533 100000 100 10000 * *
PA 1.04 0.76 858 77747 819 30154 1430 229936 1022 109950 1335 19644 631 27054 1354 100421
Allentown 0.84 0.73 3000 13000 1000 15300 120 2500 400 1000 * * * * * *
Erie 0.97 0.25 * * 200 20288 * * * * 71 9400 * * 278 4700
Philadelphia 1.38 0.39 815 92100 882 37159 3100 668955 1151 45818 1717 22625 578 26507 2235 355201
Pittsburgh 1.25 1.16 485 67701 2944 129333 600 13228 1705 433169 * * 1162 44030 3413 30716
Reading 0.83 0.72 * * 500 3500 * * 508 120843 * * * * * *
Notes: Industry codes:  1=clothing, textiles, shoes, leather; 2=wood, glass, pottery; 3=food, tobacco; 4=metals, machinery;
5=printing; 6=construction, building; 7=other.
* :  No observations
Columns 3-16 represent establishments with at least five employees.




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Linear Regression of Probit Estimation of Kernel Estimation of Linear Regression of Linear Regression of
Success Probability Success Probability Success Probability Duration Post-Strike Wage
Robust Robust Average [95% Robust Robust
Variable Coefficient Standard Error dF/dX Standard Error Derivative Confidence Interval] Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
fracout  .178*** .049 .211*** .057 .035 [.019, .051] -31.5*** 8.45 .080*** .021
prev  .115**  .050 .129** .053 -.012 [-.031, .003] -5.30 4.71 .036 .023
legal  .176*   .097 .196* .111 -.015 [-.058, .027] -35.1*** 10.6 .242*** .042
prevleg -.181**  .079 -.195**  .083 -.054 [-.108, .003] 11.3 7.98 -.174*** .034
wage_pre -.072**  .034 -.076* .039 -.001 [-.004, .003] 13.2**  5.39 .785*** .012
uskill_w  .375*** .132 .441*** .161 .005 [.003, .008] -16.0 14.7 .179*** .059
klratio -.131*** .021 -.157*** .029 -.027 [-.037, -.015]  3.95*  2.27 -.023**  .010
output_v  .432*** .154 .513*** .197 .151 [.011, .264] -49.5 16.9 .095 .080
mue -.368*** .082 -.398*** .096 -.051 [-.062, -.039]  5.70 7.81 -.012 .036
prize1  .006 .091 -.045 .118 .126 [.071, .191] 22.7 16.0
prize2 -.157**  .072 -.177**  .098 -.191 [-.409, .011] 52.0*** 17.0
Q2Q3  .174*** .031 .187*** .033 .075 [.039, .102] -6.02 4.21 .021 .014
MW  .022 .089 .039 .103 .015 [-.032, .061] -18.6**  9.14 .134*** .035
NE  .162 .099 .184 .113 .017 [-.116, .142] -44.5*** 11.4 .069*   .041
close10 11.3**  4.37
duration -.00138** .0003
dursq .002*** .001
constant  .108  .204 69.2*** 23.2 .043 .088
# of obs 1108 1108 1108 1108 2109
R-squared 0.153 0.120 0.106 0.709
NOTES:
fracout: fraction of employees striking
prev: dummy = 1 if previous successful strike in industry/location
legal: dummy = 1 if unions legal
prevleg: dummy = prev*legal
wage_pre: pre-strike daily wage ($)
uskill_w: average wage to unskilled labor in the area ($)
klratio: firm’s capital-labor ratio ($1000/worker)
output_v: value of the firm’s annual output ($million)
mue: local unemployment level (months/year)
prize1: absolute value of the wage change ($)
prize2: prize1 multiplied by the number of pre-strike employees ($1000)
Q2Q3: dummy = 1 if strike started April-September
MW: regional dummy for IL, IN, MI,OH
NE: regional dummy for CT, MA, ME, NH
close10: dummy = 1 if the predicted success probability from Column 2 is between .4 and .6
duration: duration of strike (days)
dursq: duration squared  (1000 days)
*, **, ***: statistically significant at the .1, .05, and .01 levels, respectively
The average derivative in Column 3 is calculated as follows:  For each variable X, PH is the estimated probability of strike 
success evaluated at the 90th percentile (X90) of X and at the means of the other variables.  PL is the estimated probability
at the 10th percentile (X10) and at the means of the other variables.  The average derivative is (PH – PL)/(X90 – X10). 
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Table 5 





1880-1896 equilibrium 10.6% -0.7%
1897-1904 growth spurt 17.9% 1.1%
1905-1915 equilibrium 17.7% 1.5%
1916-1921 growth spurt 37.5% 10.5%
1922-1933 decline 26.8% -2.6%
1934-1937 growth spurt 30.5% 3.3%
Sources: Griffin (1939), Gordon (2006)  
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Figure 1 
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Source: U. S. Commissioner of Labor (1888, 1896) 
 
Figure 2 












































Source: Griffin (1939); DeLong (2000) 
 
Figure 4 
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Source: Atack and Bateman (2006), U.S. Commissioner of Labor (1888, 1896) 
Note:  Concentration ratios are medians of indicated industries for 1901. “1860 and 1947” indicates that 





1 Printing publishing telegraph 2.9% 1% printing and publishing
2 misc 8.0% 3% miscellaneous
3 Cooperage and wooden goods 11.3% 12% furniture (1860 and 1947)
4 Glass and pottery 9.0% 13% stone, clay, glass products
5 Clothing textiles shoes leather 11.3% 20% cotton, wool, boots & shoes, leather, clothing (1860 and 1947)
6 Food prep and brewing 7.6% 39% flour milling, meatpacking, liquor
7 Machines and machinery 11.7% 41% agricultural implements, machinery
8 Metals and metallic goods 9.7% 46% iron castings, iron bar
9 Tobacco 7.2% 50% tobacco
10 Building trades and trans eqpt 6.8% 57% trans eqpt  
